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Translated by
Defense Language Branch

EXCERPTS FROM "RECORDS OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY"
(T.N.: KOKUSAI GAIKO ROKU), 1933, BY SUGIMURA, Yotaro.

Morning, 19 Sept. The First News of the Incident.

At midnight of Sept. 18, the 6th year of Showa(1931), Chinese regular troops destroyed the Manchurian Railway line near Liujaokow and this led to armed conflicts between Japanese and Chinese forces. The Japanese in a twinkling captured North Taipei, General Chang Hsuehliang's army base. This first report of the Manchurian incident was flashed early on the following morning (3 p.m., the 19th, Tokyo Time) to my residence in Geneva, the City of Peace where I was one of the Under-Secretaries General of the League of Nations as Dr. Nitobe's successor. At the report I stood aghast, realizing how grave the situation was.

It was Sakamoto, a Japanese official of the League of Nations Secretariat who brought the report to my residence located in a very quiet residential section near the suburbs of Vienna. Just at that time the regular September general meeting of the League was in session and the regular League of Nations Council meeting was scheduled for the following day Sept. 19. For that reason there had gathered in the city more than twenty members of the Japanese Representatives Department of the League, among them was Japanese Representative of the League Council, Kenkichi, YOSHIZAWA, Japanese Ambassador to France. I promptly made arrangements by phone for a conference with Mr. YOSHIZAWA and we

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measures to meet the situation. But it seemed that the League had been promptly informed of the incident, for almost at the simultaneous moment that we had learned of the incident. Mr. Komeil (T.N.: phonetic), Chief of the Intelligence Section of the League informed me by phone rather exaggeratedly, the whole truth of the incident.

It was quite natural that armed conflicts between Japanese and Chinese troops should constitute a problem for the League, especially since it was in the midst of a session at that time. I realized at once how grave was my responsibility being chief of the Political Affairs Section of the League, and I drove out at once to the League Secretariat on the lake, keeping in contact with the Japanese representative department at the same time.

When I received the first report of the incident, what flashed through my mind was the actions of England when she despatched troops to Shanghai in 1927 to take part in a military action. The relations between England and China at that time were so strained that the Kuomintang regime forces finally seized the English Settlement of Hankow, and the anti-English movement spread like wild fire finally even leading to endangering the lives and property of the English residents in Shanghai. As a result, the English Prime Minister Baldwin boldly decided to despatch English troops to Shanghai both from England and India in order to protect the English nationals living there. Simultaneously with the despatching of troops, he sent a lengthy memorandum to (Sir James Eric) Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, giving a full account of the situation and stated with emphasis that despite the provisions of the League Covenant, he had no alternative than to take the step as a counter measure to the Chinese acts of violence. To this, the League of Nations, permitting tacitly the English assertion, did not take

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any objectionable stand. No sooner was England aware of this than she purposely regarded it as the League's tacit consent and boldly carried out her plan. It was a very ingenious diplomatic move indeed. However, the despatching of troops by England at that time was executed after much consultation by the Government and the military which thoroughly deliberated the diplomatic policies and the suitable time of their execution. In short, she carried out her plan after a long period of preparation. But in the case of our Manchurian incident, it was an unexpected affair altogether. I had always been watchful of the movements of General Chang Hsuehliang's government, but little did I imagine that such a grave affair would break out in Manchuria. The first report of the incident, herefore, came upon me as a thunderbolt. England's actions were a pre-arranged course. The cause of this Manchurian incident was a sudden occurrence, which caught us altogether unprepared, I must admit frankly.

On Sept. 19, at the Japanese representatives' quarters at the Hotel Metropole I had a conference with YOSHIZAKA, Japanese Representative of the League Council, SATO, Shobu, Japanese Ambassador to Belgium, Setsuzo, SAWADA, Japanese Director of the League Secretariat, and ITO, Jussui, Vice-Director of the same and we cudgelled our brains as it was the most serious affair in the thirteen years since our country joined the League of Nations. We wondered what measures we should take towards the League. There was no knowing what would normally develop out of such an incident. Moreover, unlike England, we had not been diplomatically prepared for such a contingency, and we took great pains so to find a way to adjust our relations with the League. The opinions of all the representatives were heard, and having been agreed upon that it would be sound to proceed by'

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localizing the situation, we despatched a report to Tokyo, stating in detail the situation within the League and the above views. At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held on the 19th, Shih Chao-chi, Chinese Representative stated that he would present his proposal after full details were reported, and our representatives also refrained from making any detailed statements for lack of information.

Prime Minister WAKATSUKI, on receipt of the reports both from Manchuria and Geneva, called an important meeting of his Cabinet. At least, as far as government matters were concerned, the Japanese Government at that time seemed to act along the lines suggested by us. But it seemed that the actions at the outset of the incident had lacked liaison between the Tokyo Government and the Manchuria based Japanese troops, as well as harmonious relationship between the latter and our diplomatic officers in Manchuria, and no adequate reports were furnished to Geneva. Therefore, the actions of our troops in Manchuria were carried out ahead of the policies taken by our home Government, and, our diplomacy was put in a subordinate position. Such being the case, our diplomatic officers were so busy offering excuses for the actions of our troops that they had hardly time enough to enlighten the authorities of foreign countries with their authoritative explanations of our basic national principles.

Why the Japanese representatives made no appeal to the League as England did before, was a question of time and time again asked of our representatives at the League, but we had no choice than to reply that it was an altogether impossible situation for us. Both Japanese and Chinese troops, being stationed, in Manchuria, their supreme commanders had always been prepared to adopt emergency measures if need be. In Manchuria from normal times

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the anti-Japanese situation had been so intense that it was like a powder keg ready to explode at the slightest touch. But no one could foretell what proportions it would assume and with what rapidity it would develop. Moreover, it was quite different from the anti-English agitation which England suffered under and against which she steadily made preparations. It was a situation which had steadily been developing by itself, independent of the will of the military authorities in Tokyo. In short, it was a case in which the situation had developed before diplomatic negotiations could be made. Was it then possible to furnish the League with information regarding the disposition? To tell the truth, the real situation was that we could not actively take up the matter with the League.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by SUGIMURA, Yotaro, consisting of 91 pages and entitled "Records of International Diplomacy" is a book which was bought in 1935 at Tokyo, and which has been thenceforth in my custody.

certified at Tokyo,

on this 17th day of Jan., 1947

CHARA, Shinichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

OKO, Mitsuo (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo Japan

Date 25 Feb., 1947